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come affected with a public interest because of the nature of the business
and the position it occupies in the economic and industrial life of the peo-
ple. In Wolff Packing Companyi v. The Court of Industrial Relztions,14 the
court classified industries affected with a public interest as follows: (a)
those which are carried on under authority of public grant which imposes
a duty to render public service, (b) certain exceptional occupations which
have from earliest times been regarded as subject to regulation, and (c)
businesses which, though not public in inception, may be said to have
become such and have thus become subject to regulation (because of virtual
monopoly and indispensable service). It would appear then, and it was so
conceded by the appellant in the instant case, that fire insurance companies
are affected with a public interest and subject to regulation by the state
under its police power.
The United States Supreme Court in the instant case took judicial
notice of the following: that arbitration clauses have long been inserted
voluntarily in insurance policies, that the amount of the loss is fruitful
and often the only subject of controversy, that speedy determination of
such liability is a matter of wide concern, and that for such appraisal
expert knowledge and prompt inspection of the property is more easily
available by arbitration method than "in the more deliberate processes of
a judicial proceeding."
There can be no doubt that such a regulation in the case of a public
calling provides for due process of law both as to procedure and substance,15
and, with the above consideration in mind, perhaps such a social interest
has been found as to render such a regulation reasonable and not arbi-
trary and therefore providing for procedural and substantive due process
of law even as to a business not in a class of public calling.16
J. S. H.
PUBLIC CALLINGS-WHEN IS A BUSINESS A PUBLIC CALLING--REGULATION
TO WHICH THEY MAY BE SUBJECTED--The Plaintiff, a duly licensed manu-
facturer and distributor of ice, brought this suit to enjoin the defendant
from manufacturing and distributing that product without procuring a
license as required by statute.' This statute made it a misdemeanor to
manufacture, sell or distribute ice except when one had been granted a
license to do so by the Corporation Commission. Sec. 3 of the act pro-
vided that a hearing should be held before issuing a license and that the
commission might refuse to grant it unless necessity for the business were
-Wolff Paoking Co. v. court of Industrial Relations (1923), 262 U. S. 522, 43
Sup. Ct. 630.
15munn v. Illinois (1876), 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77; People v.. Budd (1892),
117 N. Y. 1, 22 N. E. 670; German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis (1914), 233 U. S. 389,
34 Sup. Ct. 612; National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wamberg (1922), 260 U. S. 71;
In re Opinion of .Tustice (1903), 55 At. 828.
'Bunting v. Oregon (1917), 243 U. S. 426, 37 Sup. Ct. 435; Holder v. Hardy
(1898), 169 U. S. 366, 18 Sup. Ct. 383; Knoxville Loan Co. V. Harbison (1901), 183
U. s. 13, 22 Sup. Ct 1; Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell (1911), 222 U. S. 225, 32 Sup.
Ct 74; Atkins v. Kansas (1903), 191 U. G. 207. 24 Sup. Ct. 124; McLean v. Ar-
kansas (1909), 211 U. S. 539, 29 Sup. Ct 206; Schmidinger v. City of Chicago
(1913), 226 U. S. 578.
± Oklahoma Session Laws of 1925, Chap. 147.
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shown-that is, unless the facilities then being furnished by a person,
firm, or corporation already licensed were not sufficient to supply the needs
of the public in the community in which the applicant proposed to locate.
The decree in the court of original jurisdiction was for the defendant upon
the theory that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. This is an appeal by the plaintiff from
an order of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals affirming the decree
of the lower court. Held, decree afflrmed.2
The state surely does not have the power to refuse to permit a citizen
to engage in any lawful private business without showing a public necessity
for him to do so unless the business is a public calling-that is, "affected
with a public interest." This fact was assumed in both the majority and the
dissenting opinions. Perhaps no better statement of the law upon this
subject can be found than that in the case of The People V. Budd.3 There
the court said that the power to regulate depends upon the police power, and
that while this power does not ordinarily extend to a private business, it
will when such a business becomes so affected with a public interest that
its regulation is necessary for the public welfare.
How is it to be determined whether or not a business is a public calling?
For many years there was such confusion in the cases upon this point that
it would have been impossible to state a definite rule. Some writers are
of the opinion that originally all businesses were in this class.4 Some of
the early cases indicate that this theory is not without foundation. 5 But
whatever was the law at that time, there can be no question but that only
some businesses are public callings today. To determine which fall within
this class the courts have, from time to time, applied a number of tests.
It has been held that any business which is a virtual monopoly-that is,
has a strong tendency toward monopolization-is a public calling.7  It is
evident that this test by itself is not conclusive, as many businesses, such
as groceries and meat markets, which unquestionably render an indispen-
sable service are not public callings. Another test which has been sug-
gested is legislative declaration-that is, the courts have said that a legisla-
ture can make any business a public calling by merely declaring it to be
one.8  This has, of course, been repudiated. 9  Indeed, the courts have en-
forced public calling duties in business in regard to which no legislation
existed.10 Another suggested test is historical survival. 1 If all businesses
2 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, Supreme Court of the United States, March 21,
1932, 52 Sup. CL 371.
3 117 N. Y. 1, 22 N. E. 670 (1889).
' Adler, "Business Jurisprudence," 28 Harv. L. IT. 135 (1915).
5 Year Book 19, Henry VI 49, pl. 5 (1441) ; KelIw. 50, pl. 4 (1450) ; Year Book
10 Henry VIII, pl. 14 (1494).
'Allnut v. Ingles (1810), 12 East. 527; Munn v. Illinois (1876), 94 U. S. 113.
German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis (1914), 233 U. S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612.
8Brass v. North Dakota ex rel. Stoeser (1894), 153 U. S. 391, 14 Sup. Ct. 857.
'Frost v. By. Comm. of Calif. (1926), 271 U. S. 583, 46 Sup. Ct. 605; Wolff
Packing Co. vp. Ct. of Industrial Relations of Kansas (1923), 262 U. S. 522, 43 Sup.
Ct. 630.
"State ex rel. Mason v. Consumers' Power Co. (1912), 119 Minn. 225, 137 N.
W. 1104.
" Wolff Packing Co. -. Ct. of Industrial Bel. of Hans. (1923), 262 U. S. 522,
43 Sup. Ct. 630.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
were formerly public callings, it is obvious that such a test has little value.
Some courts have said that a business is a public calling when the grant of
a public privilege is necessary to its operation.12 This test can not be con-
clusive, for many businesses have been held to be public callings when there
was no such grant of a privilege.13 It seems, however, that at last the
United States Supreme Court has adopted a definite test. This test is virtual
monopoly plus indispensable service.14 This was the test which was applied
in the principal case. While the grant of a public privilege was mentioned
in the majority opinion, it is obvious that virtual monopoly plus indispen-
sable service was the test actually used both there and in the dissenting
opinion.
Is the business of manufacturing, selling, and distributing ice a virtual
monopoly and is the service rendered indispensable? Apparently in the
majority opinion, and certainly in the dissenting one, the court admitted
that ice is indispensable. The majority of the court said, however, that
while the business may have once been of a monopolistic character it is no
longer possible for it to be oppressively monopolized because ice can now
be manufactured in the home with either gas or electricity at a moderate
cost. The dissenting justices, on the other hand, expressed their opinion
to be that home refrigeration methods are still in their infancy, and that
it is not only possible for those in the business of manufacturing and dis-
tributing ice to form dangerous and injurious virtual monopolies, but that
experience has shown that they have a strong tendency to do so. It seems
that this question is essentially one of fact and that we must accept the
opinion of the majority of the court as to present nature of the business.
The question is, at any rate, a close one, and it would be impossible to say
arbitrarily that the court reached either the right or wrong conclusion.
Another, and perhaps more interesting, question which this ease pre-
sents is whether or not the control provided for by the statute was con-
stitutional even if we assume that the business involved is a public calling.
Public callings are under a duty to serve everyone in the class they under-
take to serve' 5 with reasonably adequate facilities16 and for a reasonable
compensation.17 They may be subjected to whatever regulation is necessary
in the enforcement of such obligations, but can not be made to submit to
unreasonable regulations.' 8 Is the control provided by the statute neces-
sary and reasonable? The majority of the court answers this in the nega-
tive, and points out that the effect of the enactment would be to foster
(rather than to discourage) monopoly. This is obviously true, and is ad-
32Haugen v. Albina Water Co. (1891), 21 Ore. 411, 28 Pao. 244; 'Wolff Packing
Co. v. Ct. of Indus. Bet. of Kans. (1923), 262 U. S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630.UMunn . Illinois (1876), 94 U. S. 113; -People v. Budd (1889), 117 N. Y. 1, 22
N. E. 670; German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis (1914), 233 U. S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612.
14 Williams v. The Standard Oil Co. (1928), 278 U. S. 236, 49 Sup. Ct 115;
Block v. Hirsch (1921), 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458; Tagg Bros. v. The United
States (1929), 280 U. S. 420, 50 Sup. Ct. 220.
'1KeiZw, 50 P1. 4 (1450) ; State ex rel. Gwyjnv. Telephone Co. (1901), 61 S. C.
83, 39 S. E. 257.
I$Baker v. Boston & M. B. Co. (1906), 74 N. H. 100, 65 AtI. 386; Camden, etc.,
B. Co. v. Hoosey (1882), 99 Pa. St. 497.
'-Allnut v. Inglis (1810), 12 East 527, 104 Engi. Repr. 206; Munn v. Illinois
(1876), 94 U. 113.
-Wilson v. -Vew (1917), 243 U. S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298.
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mitted in the dissenting opinion. The dissenting justices, however, say
that sometimes monopolization is desirable and that it may both improve
the service rendered and reduce the cost. They point out the well estab-
lished law of economics that mass production cheapens the cost of manu-
facture and improves the methods of distribution. The point made in the
dissenting opinion is clearly well taken. There is no incongruity in saying
that a business may be controlled because of its monopolistic tendency and
then saying that the control may take the form of further monopolization.
The court merely looks into the monopolistic character of the business to
determine whether or not it falls within that class which is so "affected with
the public interest" that its regulation is necessary for the public welfare.
If the business is of such a nature, there is no reason why legislation can
not be valid which will tend to further monopolize it, if the public interest
can best be served by so doing. It seems, then, that we must conclude that
such regulation may be within the limits of the police power. W. H. H.
REAL PROPERTY-BOUNDARIES--APPORTIONMENT OF ExcEss OR DE-
FICIENCY-The defendants bought a lot and erected thereon a brick business
building. The plaintiff, who owns the north 40 feet of the lot which adjoins
the defendant's lot on the south, claims that the building extends over upon
his lot a distance of 4% inches, and brought an action for damages and
possession and to quiet title. The tier of seven lots on the west side of
Meridian street, in which the lots of the parties are included, is shown by
the plat to have a distance of 367.4 feet along the street. The actual dis-
tance, however, is 366 feet, being short 1.4 feet. Along the alley line, the
shortage is 1 foot. Two of the seven lots are irregular in shape, one of
the two being the plaintiff's lot. The defendant's lot is regular in shape
and is the second from the north end of the tier. The end lot has a width
of 50 feet according to the plot and is occupied by buildings extending the
full 50 feet. The width of the defendant's lot is 50 feet, according to the
plat, and the foundation of the defendant's store building is 49.64 feet wide,
extending from the end lot. It follows that if the shortage is not absorbed
in the irregular shaped lots, the dimensions of which are stated on the plat,
or elsewhere, and if a proportionate part of the shortage must be taken
from all lots in the tier, including the defendant's lot, then the defendant's
south wall is over four inches south of their property line, unless the limits
have been otherwise fixed by adverse possession or in some other manner.
The plaintiff is in possession of all the land called for in his deed and has
never been called upon to give up any part of the land so held. No owners
of lots other than the owners of the two lots in question have been made
parties to this action. Held, that the plaintiff cannot recover under the
rule of apportionment as no other owners of lots in the tier have been
joined. The court adds that there is a probability that the defendants have
gained title to the strip by adverse possession.'
Indiana seems to have adopted the rule as to government sections that
the interior lots in fractional sections shall be made to contain the legal
number of acres, on an original survey, and that any deficiency shall be
1IGelger v. UlM, Supreme Court of Indiana, March 11, 1932, 180 N. E. 10.
